

- **Meeting Date:** 28 March 2023
- **Meeting Time:** 11:00 am-12:30 pm
- **Location:** IOM Conference Room, Erbil & Remote connection via Teams

**In Attendance:** IOM, PRM Office, DTM, REACH, NRC / DSTWG, IRC, Samaritan's Purse (SP), German Consulate General - Consul Economic Coop. and Development, OCHA, PAO, UNHCR, DRC, Solidarites International, IOM/DS, ECHO, IMC, CRS, and Welthungerhilfeand

**Agenda:**

1. **Introduction and adoption of minutes:** Review of February minutes
2. **Context Update:** DTM Update: Displacement Index and Climate Emergency Tracking; and CCCM Updates
3. **REACH Presentation:** AL-Latifya Area-Based Assessment (ABA)
4. **OCHA Presentation:** Iraq Humanitarian Transition Overview 2023
5. **DSTWG:** DS Updates
6. **REACH Presentation: Returns and Durable Solutions (ReDS) Governorate Profiles; Ninewa, Salah al-Din, and Diyala**
7. **AOB**

1. **Introduction and adoption of minutes:** Review of previous minutes; Follow up on action points from the previous meeting.

- No pending action points.
- Endorsement of the previous meeting minutes.

2. **Context Update: DTM Update: Displacement Index and Climate Emergency Tracking**

*(Please refer to the full presentation link for further details)*

**Climate-induced displacement in central and southern Iraq:** Started in June 2018 in response to worsening drought conditions

- **Coverage**
  - 10 governorates in Central and Southern Iraq
  - 347 locations assessed, including 82 new locations.
- 12,212 families (73,272 individuals) displaced by drought as of March 2023
- **Key districts of origin**
  - Al-Shatra, Thi-Qar
  - Qal'at Saleh, Missan
  - Afaq, Qadissiya
  - Nassriya, Thi-Qar
- **Key districts of displacement**
  - Najaf district, Najaf
  - Amara, Missan
  - Al-Shatra, Thi-Qar
- Intradistrict displacement – 38%
- Intragovernorate displacement – 70%

**Discussion**

- Question: Has DTM done any comparison between the Displacement Index and Return Index hotspots to see if there are any commonalities, and has DTM conducted any sort of analysis to identify those places where the severity is the same, for instance, Sinjar?
  - DTM: DTM will be combining the two data sets as part of the future Durable Solutions Compact, although DTM has never attempted a direct comparison of the displacement index and return index. In order for both IDPs and returnees to fully achieve a durable solution, it is necessary to identify high-priority areas that are in of need support. Therefore, it's possible that, beyond the DS compact, DTM could use that analysis to possibly contribute to a report in order to try to understand, if the drivers of severity are different for these two groups or where they are the same, and then to come up with some explanations to where that overlap is occurring.
- Question: Does DTM monitor these families' returns as part of the emergency tracking between 2016 and the present? displacing to urban areas or areas where they may be dependent on farming. Does the same group of families return if the weather changes or if it rains? Or have they remained displaced?
  - DTM: DTM keeps track of return movements and makes notes of where those occur. For instance, the majority of the people who had fled in the 1st place ended up returning, according to a data collection exercise that was focused on returnees who are being displaced by environmental conditions. Thus, DTM excluded this group from the climate-induced displacement case. However, DTM discovered that, as the number of individuals being displaced increases every round, that's partly because of coverage, but it's also because the net flow of people leaving is exceeding any returns that DTM is recording, which is part of why we're seeing this reduction. Interviews with families have shown that this is often a permanent decision and in the details of the sale of land, livestock, and other assets in order to finance their migration in the 1st place, which makes it much more difficult to return. Therefore, while some families have certainly expressed an interest in returning, for certain families, it is simply not viable given their particular economic situation. Even if conditions improve in a particular year, also DTM stresses the sort of cumulative impacts of this. If someone's engaged in farming and incurring debt every year due to lower and lower yields, one particular year isn't necessarily going to be enough to make the difference either to not displace or to decide to return.

- Question: In the past, the climate induced displacement families were engaged in agriculture and livestock rearing. What are they currently seeking as a career and a means of support?
  - DTM: According to the DTM field teams, people, often moving from rural areas to the nearest urban center, then, the livelihoods that they tend to practice in those areas tend to be in the informal sector. Construction is a particularly popular livelihood as well as employment by small businesses. Climate migrants also working in bazaars in informal rules as well. Noteworthy, IOM conducted a study called migration into fragile setting, which focused on the livelihoods of people displaced by climate change and moving specifically to Basra City. It discovered that, outside of the field of livelihoods, underemployment was a major concern, rather than unemployment. This was due to the fact that the work they were doing just did not have to pay enough to cover their basic necessities. Therefore, assisting these families adjust into their new communities and focusing on their livelihoods is quite vital.
- Question: The climate-induced displacement demonstrates that a significant proportion of families are staying in private shelters. Do they live on their own properties, rent housing, or do they share housing with relatives, or neighbors?
  - DTM: According to the aforementioned IOM research, families frequently move into these housings with very precarious or tenuous arrangements. Mainly, those people are living in informal housing which can place them in a really difficult situation and increase their risk of eviction. Thus, even if they aren't necessarily considered critical shelters, these shelter conditions are nonetheless not ideal. In terms of who they are living with, DTM discovers that most moves involve complete households. One family member might go first, followed by the rest of the family, in a kind of staged sequence. Social networks can have an impact on where people choose to move, according to field notes.
- Question: Is there information available regarding who are the actors/donors already supporting these areas with climate-induced displacement (high severity areas especially)?
  - Given its mandate, IOM is one of the primary organizations focused on climate-related displacement. There are several organizations that are concerned with the effects of climate change and environmental deterioration in general, including REACH which has done some interesting, climate-induced displacement assessments as well as ACF and have been engaged more broadly on. Additionally, there are community-led projects worth noticing. Regarding donors, KfW and BHA have demonstrated a desire to address vulnerabilities arising from increasing environmental deterioration.

#### CCCM Updates:

##### Jeddah 5 Formal Camp:

- Current camp population is 423 HHs/1,902 individuals.
- CCCM Camp Management continues to provide basic but essential camp management services including partner coordination, community engagement, and site maintenance.
- Following the latest departure that was supported by the IOM FVR program on the 22nd of February at which a total of 348 HH departed J5 through the TRD program back to their AoO and AoR. 65 HHs were left in sectors T & Q which MoMD wanted to consolidate/close. IOM CCCM supported these HHs in relocating to sectors U & R during the second week of March. Following the relocation sectors T&Q was officially considered closed and CCCM started decommissioning some of the humanitarian facilities in the empty blocks and will start fencing the consolidated beginning of April.
- Following the consolidation, it was noticed that security actors imposed some restrictions on the camp gate. IDPs were not allowed to leave the camp unless they present a document justifying the reason (hospital, court, school). However, these movement restrictions were later lifted and IDPs were again allowed to move freely in and out of the camp.
- Due to funding shortfall, WFP ceased its food assistance program in Jeddah 5 with March food distribution being the last distribution to be supported by WFP, while according to the WFP Head of Mosul Office, the last food assistance in Jeddah 1 is anticipated to be in May 2023. In a letter to MOMD WFP is proposing two options for continuing the provision of food:
  - The GOI to provide the necessary funds for WFP to continue food provision, OR
  - Hand over the responsibility of the program to the GOI.
- It's important to note that refugee camps are exempted from this decision as they don't have access to the Public Distribution System (PDS). However, this exemption is only temporary and subject to future funding availability. In the meantime, WFP has committed to supporting MOMD in conducting information sessions for IDPs on how to apply for PDS funds online. WFP conducted information sessions in both J5 and J1 and shared messages with the site residents.

##### Informal sites update:

- During the month of March, a water shortage was reported in AAF informal site following the withdrawal of UNICEF-supported partner SSORD and the handover of the WASH services to the local authorities in AAF beginning of this year. Trying to understand the reason CCCM contacted the government focal point and confirmed that the water shortage is due to the lack of the government capacity to hire pump operators and pay their salaries. Last week we were informed that two operators were hired for 2 months through contributions from the civil community, but this is a temporary solution, and the local authority needs to address this in the longer term. We were also informed that 29 new HHs were newly registered but 18 are from blocked areas.
- In the kilo 7 informal site, health partner PUI is planning to withdraw from Kilo 7 site due to a funding shortage. PUI has been providing MHPSS, HHP, and support for health clinics in Kilo 7 and Kilo 5 sites. The current health partner is DARI, which provides a mobile clinic and offers a limited number of health services, and some light medication. Additionally, there is a health center run by the government, but it lacks capacity and is not frequently used by people, PUI is used to support this center with a resident doctor. It is anticipated that their withdrawal will create a gap in the delivery of healthcare services for the 572 IDP HHs remaining on the site.

We have heard that during the last MoMD Minister to Bzebeiz the minister mentioned that the Gov have the plan to re-formalize / reconsider Bzbz as a formal camp to address the urgent humanitarian needs of site residents, especially understating that the majority are from Jur Al Sakhur and Aweisat and they can't return

to their areas of origin because their areas are blocked. This will include fencing the site and assigning Central MoMD camp management and potentially starting food assistance. OCHA is following up with the Minister and had requested MoMD for a formal announcement however MoMD Minister's office indicated that the government is not planning to disclose this publicly as this might negatively impact the government's effort to close the file of displacement. According to what we have heard that the government also plans to relocate the residual caseload in AAF who are from blocked areas to BZBZ once it is reconsidered as a formal camp.

- Long pending distribution of cash for NFI in the Samaraa Al Huda informal site due to delays in access letter will finally be conducted after access was regranted.
- Last week IOM NFI team completed the distribution of winter and items clothes to families in Hay Al Jamiaa through an e-voucher system.
- Following the forced eviction of IDPs from the Souq Almash informal site (ACTED-supported informal site) IOM NFI completed the registration of the 59 HHs affected by this eviction who will be receiving emergency cash in the amount of 300,000 IQD per HH.

#### Discussion

- Question: What kind of help, if any, the partners—including IOM—are providing to the families who were evicted from the HTC?
  - CCCM: Regarding the assistance given, IOM provided evicted families who had been relocated or further displaced to the nearby areas, the emergency cash assistance.

### 3. REACH Presentation: AL-Latifya Area-Based Assessment (ABA)

*(Please refer to the full presentation link for further details)*

#### Local stakeholder recommendations:

##### Key Social Issues & Social Cohesion

- To tackle youth violence, community leaders mentioned the need for cultural and educational programmes to provide healthy outlets and emotional management,
- In addition, some community leaders reported the need for community reconciliation programmes in the area,
- Programmes addressing livelihood opportunities.

Livelihoods & Employment: To improve livelihoods in the area:

- Cash-for-work programmes, creating livelihood programmes by NGOs and government,
- Investing/opening projects (factories, workshops, agricultural) to provide job opportunities,
- Vocational training courses, especially for women and youth.

#### Discussion

- Question: Are there ethnic disparities between the IDPs and the host community and the people that flew to AL-Latifya and Kilo?
  - REACH: The families are primarily from the districts of Miqdadiyah and Babil Governorate, often they come from nearby communities to Al-Latifya regarding the religious composition of Al-Latifya town. Sunni Arabs dominates in the east and west parts of the town. Whereas Shiaa predominate in the town's north and south. It is uncertain whether this extends to IDPs displaced from Southern governorates, notably Babil. IDPs and host communities virtually all belong to the same ethnic group. IDPs moved there for that reason. As they are more integrated and feel safer than other places. Also, the fact that they share the same ethnic groupings explains why they often express a sense of community or trust in other community members.
- Question: Regarding employment, specifically whether there were any reported instances of discrimination between IDPs and Host Communities or whether there was a limited opportunities for employment in general for both population groups?
  - REACH: Overall, no discrimination has been reported. Nonetheless, discrimination cannot be ruled out completely. However, unemployment was a common concern, mainly with the graduates. Everyone was reliant on irregular employment, primarily construction. According to the findings, there were few distinctions between IDPs and the host community.
- Question: IDPs cited discrimination as one of their main concerns as one of their main fears of returning home, apart from the militia blockage. Please elaborate further on that.
  - REACH: It is a highly delicate issue, politically. Regrettably REACH does not have a lot of information gathered in this regard; it appears that it's most likely triggered by community tensions Concerning, the militias controlling the area, it didn't come out during REACH interviews nor the household or the community leaders' ones. Some of the qualitative data indicated that certain families' livelihoods may be hampered by security measures or checks where they need travel permissions to access some of the small businesses or farming.
- Question: Since the shelters are based on some irregular lands in K18, people who own them do not have the essential documents. Can you please elaborate on that?
  - REACH: Since it's illegal, they certainly don't have the authority. The government should perceive them as a formal site first to enable the IDP families to obtain documentation. There are no municipal projects for the area, no plans for the water network, no plans for electricity, and no plans for any other services, so houses were constructed irregularly and occasionally IDPs came and bought them, taking ownership without any paperwork.

### 4. OCHA Presentation: Iraq Humanitarian Transition Overview 2023

*(Please refer to the full presentation link for further details)*

#### Priorities for Humanitarian Response

- People facing serious protection risks and/or life-threatening needs who are not able to receive government assistance.

Ensuring access to public services remains a major challenge especially for IDPs and returnees but also for vulnerable host community members, including for those with real or perceived affiliations with extremist groups, illiterate populations, those living in remote locations as well as those at risk of statelessness such as Bidoons and Faili Kurds including due to their nomadic way of life.

- People reliant on humanitarian services, where the government is unwilling or not yet able to take over: Especially for services related to CCCM, Health, Sustained Livelihood, Child Protection, and Education.

## 5. DS Updates: DSTWG, and ABC Updates

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*(Please refer to the full presentation link for further details)*

### DSTWG Updates: DS Roadmap

- The concept note of a new strategy for Durable Solutions in Iraq (Compact) has been further developed by the advisors from Robert Pipers' team (Special Adviser on Solutions re Internal Displacement)
- The Compact picks up of where the 2023 Humanitarian Transition Overview left off. Builds on, concretizes, and operationalizes the National Plan, the Interagency Strategic Framework, and Pillar V of the SDCF.
- For the new strategy, the RC is currently engaging with the Government of Iraq (Federal and KRG) regarding the Compact
- Compact will be supported by (existing) data sources and evidence with a prioritized overview of sectors, population groups, and geographic areas in need of support as an indicative basis to inform the development of the DS Compact.

## 6. AOB

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- Next RWG meeting is tentatively scheduled for April 25th, 2023.