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NATIONAL PLAN FOR GETTING THE IDPS BACK TO THEIR LIBERATED AREAS



Republic of Iraq

Ministry of Migration and Displaced

Ministry of Planning

**THE NATIONAL PLAN FOR GETTING THE DISPLACED BACK TO THEIR LIBERATED
AREAS**



November 2020

Foreword by the

Minister of Immigration and Displacement

In accordance with the directives of the respected Prime Minister, Mr. Mustafa Al-Kazemi, and in implementation of the governmental program that is related to addressing the issue of displacement and achieving the voluntary return of the displaced to achieve a voluntary sustainable, safe and dignified return for displaced families, the Ministry of Migration and displaced (MoMD) worked in cooperation and joint coordination with the Ministry of Planning (MOP) in preparing the **National Plan for getting the displaced back to their liberated AoO** of which implications have taken into account, the requirements and needs of the displaced families, and mapping the programs and projects that must be implemented for solving the problems of the displaced, looking forward to intensifying and coordinating the efforts at the international and national levels to implement the plan on ground in a way that enhances and supports stability and reintegration in the governorates of origin, "a safe Iraq, with no IDPs."

Ivan Faik Jabro

Minister of Migration and Displaced

**Foreword by the
Minister of Planning**

Although more than three years have passed since the end of war against ISIL terrorist militants, the displacement file is still open due to several complications including the provision of basic service and the infrastructures in the areas of return as well as their availability, in addition to other political and security complications. The camps' residents still suffer from severe living conditions and complicated social conditions due to displacement. The Government of Iraq (GOI) is serious about closing this file and to implement the governmental program as approved by the Iraqi Parliament through achieving stability in the areas of return, facilitating the voluntary return of all IDPs and initiating reconstruction processes.

Today, building upon our humanitarian responsibilities and commitments, we are determined to continue addressing this issue, in cooperation with the MoMD. Therefore, this National Plan is designed to focus on mapping and analyzing the obstacles to the return and trying to find solutions to these obstacles of non-return by identifying the necessary solutions through highlighting the required activities and distributing responsibilities for the implementing agencies within a specific timeframe.

God Bless

**Dr. Khalid Battal Al-Najim
Minister of Planning**

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Introduction

The issue of protracted displacement in Iraq is one of the priorities included in the current governmental program, taking into consideration, the closure of camps within a specific period of time through organized programs, activities and projects through which the appropriate atmosphere is created for the return of the displaced to their AoO. The GOI is obliged to close the camps whenever solutions for safe return are available. In the event that households choose to leave the camps earlier, it is expected that this could lead to secondary displacement and unsustainable outcomes, and the government will take steps to prevent this situation for IDPs. Moreover, based on the government's directives in this regard, an implementation plan was prepared by joint team from both MoMD, and MoP supervised by UNDP and IOM to ensure the safe and voluntary return, based on several pillars that ensure solving the problems facing the IDPs upon their return to their original area and the sustainability of their post-return stability.

The GOI recognizes that while the intention of many IDPs is to return to their AoO eventually, not all the displaced people are currently able or willing to return, for many reasons. In these instances, alternatives to return, such as integration in the areas of displacement or relocation to another place within Iraq, may be necessary and/or preferred by IDPs as a temporary or long-term solution. Then the government will work to identify the needs of IDPs who are unable to return and support a range of options to solve protracted displacement.

The GOI recognizes the Iraqis' constitutional right to freedom of movement, including the IDPs. The activities outlined in this plan range from 3 months to 2 years, but more time may be required. This will be continually assessed against progress towards achieving the objectives outlined in this plan.

Chapter one

PLAN OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY AND CHALLENGES

FIRST: THE PLAN'S OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of this plan is represented by setting a general executive framework to deal with the displacement file and facilitate their voluntary and dignified return to their AoO, or identify alternative solutions for those who cannot return, within a specific period of time, in addition to contributing to their development, social re-integration, rehabilitation and empowerment, and to ensure that their aspirations are linked to the sustainable development goals. This could be implemented by achieving the following goals:

1. Identifying the number of in-camp IDPs and their geographical locations.
2. Identifying the needs of out-of-camp IDPs and the required support for them
3. Identifying the obstacles that prevent IDPs from solving their protracted displacement.
4. Identifying the required activities and programs to solve protracted displacement, which include facilitating return or any other solutions.
5. Outline a process to estimate the required financial costs for those programs and activities.
6. Distributing responsibilities and roles between the executive and supportive authorities, per specialty and jurisdiction


SECOND: THE PLAN PILLARS

The plan is based on number of pillars, including:

1. The technical pillars

Adoption of a survey methodology and conducting questionnaires and statistical surveys according to three models of forms designed by the MoMD. The adoption of the method of statistical analysis of the data obtained from surveys as well as the adoption of methodology to observe and analyze the challenges and threats facing the voluntary return, which are adopted in the setting of plan's programs that are based on four pillars as shown in Figure (1).

FIGURE NO (1) PLAN PILLARS



2. The participatory method:

It is based on the participation of the most relevant stakeholders in the plan preparation, the supporters of its implementation, and the beneficiaries by knowing their feedback on the reasons of non-return, obstacles to return and integration, the available projects and infrastructure, and the programs that the MoMD & MoP provide for their return, or other solutions, and their role in achieving durable solutions – including return.

3. Reference Benchmarks:

Achieving the required consistency between the National Plan for the return of the displaced to their liberated areas, the national development plans as well as the sustainable development goals, and the MoMD's strategic plan.

THIRD: THE RATIONALES OF THE PLAN SETTING:

In order to achieve the goals of the national development plans and sustainable development, and as a governmental commitment to the Iraqi citizens, this plan has been designed to provide a detailed analysis of the IDPs' realistic status of in the camps and the key obstacles to their return to their liberated areas, and create an executive framework for the programs and services that facilitate voluntary return and national reconciliation, integration, community rehabilitation, and sustainable stability that fulfils the IDPs' aspirations and is consistent with the sustainable development plans.

In addition to the voluntary return option, some of the in-camp and out-of-camp IDPs will not be able to return for many reasons, this requires support to identify the obstacles to solving protracted displacement and to explore additional solutions such as integration in the areas of displacement.

FOURTH: AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITIES

1. Governmental concern and commitment

Since the beginning of the crisis, the Iraqi government has given great attention to this issue because of its great humanitarian aspect, as all ministerial curricula and governmental programs of all previous governments included a main objective which is to close the displacement file, this is emerged from the principles of the Iraqi constitution, which guarantees every citizen the right to a decent life and right to reside anywhere in the country.

In this regard, the government has formed many high-level committees since the beginning of the crisis for the purpose of returning and relocating the IDPs in the AoO, and it has returned many families, compensated many of them, and tried to reintegrate them into society, but this file has not been fully closed to date because it is a very large file with many challenges as mentioned in Clause Fifth below. The Iraqi government is greatly concerned about this file through various plans and sectoral strategies, and the National Development Plan 2018-2022 has included the displacement closure file and the reconstruction of the areas affected by terrorist acts, among its targets. Moreover, the national development plan was not the only one in this field but was preceded by its general framework document for the reconstruction of areas liberated from terrorism, which paid substantial attention to the reconstruction file and revitalization of those areas and the resettlement of the displaced.

On the other hand, the current government is determined to move forward in this file, as the Prime Minister and some of the Ministers have visited the IDPs' camps more than once, and a ministerial team has been assigned to end the displacement file voluntarily. It is worth noting that the government's approach is in


harmony and consistency with the global sustainable development agenda 2015- 2030 and Iraq’s vision 2030, under the slogan (Secure Iraq, a unified society, a diversified economy, a sustainable environment blessed with wise governance) is a vision that emerged through our local unique characteristic based on the sustainable development’s dimensions.

2. Available financing scenarios (governmental and international financing)

Due to the economic and financial situation that the country is going through, which have resulted from exposure to many unplanned shocks, represented by ISIS’ effect, the subsequent economic crisis, the fall of oil prices, the Covid-19 and the global and local economic crisis, making the GOI unable to cover the obligations of the next stage of recovery and development towards ending the displacement file; despite limited financial contributions from external parties and the private sector.

Based on that, this plan was set according to an administrative financing strategy to achieve the plan objectives by establishing key principles for the financing approach based on high coordination between the relevant authorities and the optimal allocation of resources by setting priorities and mapping the type of activities, It’s worth noting that some activities in this plan are on-going, partially funded or planned to be funded, and that many of them require additional funding. A full outline of the anticipated costs will be developed after the endorsement of this plan, as shown in figure (2):

FIGURE (2) AVAILABLE FUNDING SOURCES



FIFTH / THE CHALLENGES FACING THE RETURN OF THE (IDP)

Displacement is considered as one of the international community’s significant concerns because of its humanitarian, political, economic, and demographic dimensions, and due to the role of this problem in reshaping the societies and its direct imp`act on the formation and individuals’ integration into societies. Also, it is a great concern of many institutions and NGOs, and local and international governments contributed through direct participation in mitigating the displacement’s effects. Studies conducted by the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the Norwegian Refugee Centre (NRC) for samples from camps and areas of displacement in the Middle East, have confirmed that there are fears that displacement will turn into a migration or asylum issue, and that continuous efforts being made by the Iraqi government and NGOs to analyze this problem in order to find solutions to this crisis. Iraq, due to its circumstances and the peculiarity of the social and ethnic composition, has its experience in the issue of displacement that occurs because of security, political, religious, ethnic, sectarian and even tribal conditions, it is not possible to rely on the same

conclusions reached by similar studies in other parts of the world. Thus, and as an introduction to understand the reality, a brief review of events related to IDPs in Iraq is required.

1. The political challenge

This challenge is considered the main driver of other challenges, the key player for the stability of the region and the solution for disputes to achieve security stability, prosperity, and growth, and moving the wheel of progress forward.

As it is obvious to everyone that the political trends in the country played a fundamental role in the stability of some areas in terms of security, which contributed to the return of some families to their AoO. The political factor is one of the factors that lead to the prosperity of the economy in the country; namely in the liberated areas, as political stability may contribute to a prominent role in attracting many investments and stimulating and activating the private sector and providing job and livelihood opportunities to many vulnerable groups, which is one of the factors causing some of the stray groups to join the terrorist organization.

The feeling of political marginalization is one of the most important excuses used to sweep the feelings of simple citizens, especially the youth in the areas that have been subjected to terrorism, exploiting their need and simple way of thinking, which soon became clear to all of them that they knew the incorrectness of those arguments and ideas, which were the reason behind the killing and displacement of families.

2. The Security Challenge

Perhaps, this is the most prominent challenge among all other challenges, as it represents the main cause of displacement from the areas exposed to the terrorist acts of ISIS. Some areas in some governorates that witnessed military operations are still suffering from attacks by the remnants of the terrorist organization. As a result, military operations are ongoing in some areas, with the aim of eliminating ISIS remnants and fully control those areas. Accordingly, the security situation in small cities is still unstable and fragile, which is one of the main reasons that some families are reluctant to return to their areas, while security and retaliation concerns still exist.

In addition to the result of the affiliation of some stray groups from some cities, and their involvement in displacement and killing of civilians has generated a kind of animosity in the community between the families of the victims and the affiliated families, conducive to tribal conflicts that affected the security and stability situation in those areas.

3. Economic Challenges and Infrastructure

The economic challenges and infrastructure represent the most prominent obstacles to the return of a large proportion of IDPs, especially in the conflict affected areas. These challenges emerge through several aspects, including those related to the AoO's infrastructure, shelter, housing destruction, in addition to the lack of livelihood opportunities.

As for infrastructure, a large number of infrastructures was destroyed by ISIS during its rule and then as a result of the military offensive to retake those areas.

The World Bank and the GOI estimated the post-conflict needs and requirements by (88) \$ billion, of which (30) \$ billion represent the infrastructure needs. For example, the United Nation estimated 50-75% of infrastructure has been destroyed in Ninawa, and about 60-75% of industrial companies was destroyed. It is worth mentioning that Ninawa faced a huge destruction in its infrastructures which constitute the biggest obstacle to the return of IDPs, as the United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT) found that a total of 877 sites had been destroyed by January 2017 (419 housing sites, 228 roads, 106 commercial and industrial buildings, 37 public facilities in the health and education sector, 55 public administration buildings,

21 military and security facilities, 11 recreational facilities), the water network and some bridges were destroyed, in addition to some archeological and heritage sites were destroyed.

Housing is a fundamental driver for the continuation of displacement, for two reasons: housing destruction, and issues related to the ownership of property and its restitution. A survey about the main reasons for their unwillingness to return, a large percentage of the IDPs attribute the reason to housing destruction.

The other side in the economic challenges is the scarcity or lack of income-generation job opportunities in the AoO, which makes the IDPs very reluctant to return. A survey conducted by the IOM showed that 21% of the surveyed IDPs indicated the absence of income-generating activities in the AoO as one of three reasons for not planning to return, especially since the IDPs had a sharp decline in their income, after they lost their property, savings, and job opportunities. It was natural for the poverty rates to increase among the displaced families to reach about (40%) according to the latest statistics.

In other words, one out of every three displaced individuals is currently poor. Provision of jobs or livelihood opportunities will be a key factor in enabling the IDPs to return and settle. Also, programs aiming to absorb and reframe youth in public life, and provide decent job opportunities for them, may show some delay or weakness, whether in the type and comprehensiveness of these programs, or in the procedures for their implementation in accordance with the nature of the areas and cities to which these youths belong and their tribal nature among other factors.

Pressure on the limited resources such as water, land, housing, food and education in the host areas is another important issue, especially when IDPs are housed in existing poor areas or in the poorest parts of urban areas, and the government's participation to solve camp residents' issues will decrease over time, especially in light of the current financial crisis the country is going through, and then the competition of the IDPs with the host community over scarce resources becomes an increasing source of insecurity. In the same way, reduction of aids in the camps is leading some IDPs to pursue coping strategies, and commit some unethical practices, misdemeanors, and crimes.

4. Social and psychological challenges

The social challenges in Iraq are increasing in depth due to many years of external and internal wars, and political and economic instability. As a result, the problems worsen and deepen in terms of impact and outcome.

Geographically targeted studies in conflict-affected areas in Iraq indicate that the most important social challenge is the lack of social cohesion and concerns related to the AoO, including shocks and fears of discrimination, marginalization, and violence due to social tensions, and the difficulty of rebuilding the Iraqi social fabric and overcoming what the past carried whether as a result of the violence that the IDPs were subjected to, or as a result of the hostilities among people of the area, ethnic, sectarian, and tribal tensions, as well as the tensions of the minority and the majority, all hindered the return of many displaced people, as it is one of the most important challenges of return.

Another important issue within the social challenges lies in the IDPs who were exposed to many traumas and types of discrimination in some areas, in addition to the obstacles they face while seeking to obtain or renew civil documents, since many of them lost their documents or had been confiscated from them during the displacement and some of them have illegal documents.

Civil documents are the basis for a wide range of human rights because they allow access to basic services, including health care and education, and civil services such as recognition of marital status and property rights, job opportunities and freedom of movement, and existing compensation programmes and social protection benefits, which negatively affects the IDPs' psychological status and weakens the feeling of belongingness to

their homeland. It is important to distinguish between different areas of displacement, in order to better understand the IDPs' situation, because each Iraqi governorate has specific characteristics regarding the ethnic or religious composition of its population, local policy, administrative system, and activities of the armed groups. That's why IDPs have faced different human rights violations during and before the displacement depending on the site.

Therefore, IDPs and returnees who have suffered from shocking incidents need mental health and psychological support services (MHPSS), which in most cases do not exist, especially that they coincide with the deterioration of the health services' level and lack of their provision in the AoO, and inability to meet the real needs of the population.

On the other hand, the vulnerability and combined vulnerability rates have increased (vulnerable categories + displacement) which are produced by displacement or forced displacement and reflected in the need to provide various social programs for them. As for childhood, the situation of displaced children in Iraq is in the most tragic state - a generation that is under the traumatic impact of violence and devoid of education and opportunities. Sociological impacts get deepened among the vulnerable people in general and children in particular due to the expansion of extremism's incubators, terrorism and violence resulting from the occupation, the processes of socialization, and school programs under which the children and the youths subjected, which would undermine the social fabric.

Displaced children who live in areas that were controlled by ISIS were exposed to some of the extremist violence, exploitation, and abuse, and they are presently facing additional psychological challenges due to the state of displacement and they need psychological rehabilitation and relocation in safe in order to recover and live a normal life. Many displaced children have lost their family members and caregivers during the conflict, and they remain exposed to exploitation and abuse, while others bear work burdens and their families' sustainability.

Without education, the children are deprived of opportunities to earn livelihoods in the future, which would result in their social exclusion, and inability to carry out their responsibilities as Iraqi citizens in the future. With regards to gender type, the displacement has deepened the gender type gap due to the male dominance culture. This is reflected in the implementation of integration programs and political, social and economic empowerment of women. Overall, the most important challenges facing the return can be summarized according to the governorates, as follows:

A. Baghdad (Baghdad Belts):

- Lack of job opportunities for workers in private sector and their settlement in the displacement cities of the governorate.
- Lack of financial means to re-construct their houses.

B. Salah al-Din:

- Housing and infrastructure destruction, and lack of services.
- Tribal retaliation and disputes in some areas due to the affiliation of some community members with ISIS.
- Lack of job opportunities for workers in the private sector and their settlement in the displacement cities of the governorate
- No- return of the displaced due to security, political and service- related reasons.

C. Anbar:

- Many obstacles that the remaining IDPs face in obtaining and renewing personal documentation.
- IDPs' reaction and psychological barrier and feeling of insecurity as a result of ISIS perpetrations in their areas.

- Non-acceptance of ISIS affiliated widows and their children in the governorate.

D. Ninawa:

- Housing destruction, especially in the west Mosul and Sinjar, and infrastructure destruction and lack of services in the governorate.
- Lack of job opportunities for workers in the private sector, and their settlement in the cities of displacement.
- The fear of ISIS return in the areas close to the Syrian border.
- The IDPs psychological reaction and barrier due to their loss of members of their families as a result of ISIS crimes in their areas.
- The absence of a unified local administration, and disputed areas.
- Communities' rejection of women who have suffered sexual violence by ISIS and have begotten children owing to this violence.
- Absence of administrative and local officials in Sinjar district.
- Official appointment of Sinjar mayor.

E. Babylon:

- Reservations by the security authorities and the population on the return of some households with perceived affiliation.
- Community's objection and the presence of tribal retaliation in some areas, and the affiliation of some of the community members to ISIS.
- The area's strategic location and its spatial connection to several governorates that are different in their ethno-religious composition and geographical nature, as this is an agricultural and desert area easy to be penetrated by terrorist groups.

F. Diyala:

- The presence of areas that are still considered security fragile and it is difficult to secure the IDPs return in light of the potential presence of terrorist groups.
- Community's objection and the presence of tribal retaliation in some areas, and the affiliation of some of the community members with ISIS.
- Housing and infrastructure destruction and lack of services.
- Non-acceptance of ISIS affiliated widows and their children in the governorate.

G. Kirkuk:

- Community's objection toward the return of families with perceived ISIL affiliation and the presence of tribal retaliation
- The presence of areas that are still considered as hotspots while it is difficult to secure the IDPs return in light of the potential presence of terrorist groups.

Chapter Two

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DISPLACEMENT IN IRAQ

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DISPLACEMENT IN IRAQ

This chapter deals with a presentation of the reality, numbers, and data of the emergency displacement in Iraq post 2013 through three main axes:

The first axis represents the presentation of data on the IDPs in general, their geographical locations, those who returned and those who are still displaced until now for various reasons. The second axis focuses on the in-camp IDPs by reviewing the number of families, the number of camps and their geographical distribution, as this category has priority in providing the return requirements, because they suffer from housing conditions in the camps under poverty and economic fragility compared to out-of-camp IDPs. In the third axis, the IDPs are classified in light of available data, and the reasons for non-return are mapped, the requirements for the voluntary return, or alternative solutions for displacement are mapped according to the main benchmarks.

First: General facts about displacement in Iraq:

Displacement issue in Iraq has exacerbated after 2014 followed by ISIS rule in some Iraqi governorates, which led to the displacement of residents of those governorates to other Iraqi governorates, including the Kurdistan Region. In general, 892.311 households representing around 5 million individuals have been displaced from the governorates of Anbar, Ninawa, Salah al-Din, Diyala, Kirkuk, Babylon, and Baghdad during 2014-2016.


After 2016, and with the launch of offensive to retake some areas, voluntary return began with some families return to their AoO, in light of MoMD's facilitation of the return process, along with other ministries and international NGOs. Around 573.465 households returned, while 318.855 households are still displaced in camps whit the majority out of camps. Most of the returnee households returned to their AoO despite the lack of infrastructure, services, safety, and security in their areas. Yet, the majority are in need for rehabilitation programs that may contribute to achieving stable return and prevent secondary displacement. Table (1) below shows the numbers of IDPs and returnees by governorates.

TABLE NO. (1) DISPLACED AND RETURNEE HOUSEHOLDS IN IRAQ

#	GOVERNORATE	TOTAL DISPLACED HOUSEHOLDS	RETURNEE HOUSEHOLDS	HOUSEHOLDS REMAINING IN DISPLACEMENT
1	Ninawa	308,031	171,576	136,464
2	Anbar	284,949	239,597	45,352
3	Salah al-Din	148,778	85,230	63,548
4	Diyala	69,606	36,866	32,740
5	Kirkuk	42,548	23,941	13,477
6	Baghdad	29,732	16,255	18,607
7	Babylon	8,667	0	8,667

- SOURCE: MoMD Data

FIGURE 3: THE DISPLACED AND RETURNEE HOUSEHOLDS



It is clear from the data given in the table above represent the largest percentage of the IDPs from the three governorates (Ninawa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din) with Ninawa having the largest number of IDPs totaling 308.031 households, representing around 34.5% of displaced households' caseload, followed by Anbar with a total number of 284.949 families, representing around 32% of the total number of displaced families.

As for the returnee families after liberation and the improvement in security conditions, Anbar has the highest rate of return with 239.597 families, around (42%) of the total number of families who have completely returned to their AoO in Iraq and constitutes around (84%) of the total number of displaced families from Anbar, followed by Ninawa with a total number (171.576) returnee families representing (30%) of the total returnee families, followed by other governorates with various proportions, with exception to Babylon which did not witness any return for reasons that will be explained in the next chapters.

As for families that are still in displacement, Ninawa comes first with a total number of (136.464) families, which constitutes (42.5%) of the total families that continue to be displaced, followed by Salah al-Din with (63.548) families, which constitutes (19.8%) of the total families continuing in displacement, followed by other governorates. Table No. (2) shows the percentage of return by governorate compared with the total number of IDPs:

TABLE (2) PERCENTAGE OF RETURNEE FAMILIES TO DISPLACED FAMILIES BY GOVERNORATES


#	GOVERNORATES	TOTAL DISPLACED FAMILIES	TOTAL RETURNEE FAMILIES	RETURN PERCENTAGE
1	Ninawa	308,031	171,576	56%
2	Anbar	284,949	239,597	84%
3	Salah al-Din	148,778	85,230	57%
4	Diyala	69,606	36,866	53%
5	Kirkuk	42,548	23,941	56%
6	Baghdad	29,732	16,255	55%
7	Babylon	8,667	0	0%
Total		892,311	573,465	64%

• SOURCE: MoMD Data

According to table 2, 64% households have returned to their AoO, and around 36% are still in displacement. As mentioned above, Anbar has the highest rate of return, followed by the other governorates with similar percentages representing around half of the total caseload of displaced families, with the exception to Babylon, which did not record the return of any family.

The figure below shows the return percentage by governorates.

FIGURE 4: PERCENTAGE OF IDPS' RETURNS BY GOVERNORATES



Second: Data and statistics of in-camp IDPs:

Following ISIS control of some governorates and area, which forced the families in these areas to be internally displaced, and with the absence of shelter and the difficult economic conditions, a large proportion of these families were forced to live in camps that were established after 2014 to provide shelter for the displaced. In-camp IDPs currently represent about (17%) of the entire IDP caseload.

Many out-of-camp IDPs face economic challenges and severe housing conditions, with no documentation and difficulties in accessing livelihoods, education, and other basic services. Depending on locations, out-of-camp IDPs may also be required to undergo additional administrative procedure, such as sponsorship or security clearance, to buy properties or benefit from services. All these factors mean that out-of-camp IDPs who prefer to remain in displacement, may require support to ensure that they can remain sustainably, engage in the labor market, access services, and positively participate in the host communities. This would also support social cohesion and reduce tensions in host communities. In other instances, out-of-camp IDPs may be residing in informal settlements, unfinished buildings or live with their extended members or relatives. Some of these IDPs may need support to return, while others require support to locally integrate.

Since the beginning of the displacement crisis, about (150,167) families resided in displacement camps, of whom (54,497) families still in displacement camps, however, there are 47 IDP camps. During the design of this Plan, the number of camps gradually decreased to (39) camps, because of closing some of them following the return of number of IDPs and the consolidation of other camps. Also, the number of in-camp IDPs has reduced from (54,497) households to (40,953) households. These camps are officially managed by the local governments where the camps are located, and in coordination and cooperation with the MoMD and international organizations.

TABLE (3): NUMBER OF CAMPS, THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION, AND IN-CAMP POPULATION

#	GOVERNORATE	CAMPS #	IDPS#		PERCENTAGE OF IN-CAMP IDPS TO TOTAL NUMBER
			HHs	INDIVIDUALS	
1	Ninawa	1	2,375	11,875	13%
2	Dahuk	16	27,374	136,870	
3	Sulaymaniyah	4	2,494	12,470	
4	Erbil	6	7,854	39,270	
5	Anbar	1	856	4,280	
TOTAL		28	40,953	204,765	

• Source: MoMD

FIGURE 5: CAMPS' GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION AND NUMBER OF FAMILIES




Table 3 shows that the highest percentage of camp IDPs are found in the camps of Dahuk (55.8% of the IDPs caseload) followed by Ninawa (18.2%) and Erbil (13%). In general, Kurdistan Region governorates host the highest number of IDPs (73.2%) of the total in-camp IDPs, and this percentage constitutes a pressure on the resources of the host communities.

TABLE (4) DISTRIBUTION OF CAMP IDPS BY GOVERNORATES OF ORIGIN

#	GOVERNORATE	PERCENTAGE TO TOTAL OF FAMILIES
1	Ninawa	81.2%
2	Anbar	5%
3	Salah al-Din	7.8%
4	Diyala	2.4%
5	Kirkuk	3%
6	Baghdad	5.1%
7	Babylon	0.5%
TOTAL		%100

*Source: MoMD Data

Table 4 shows that the majority of the camp IDPs come from Ninawa, as they constitute approximately (81.2%) of the in-camp households' caseload, due to the destruction amount in some of Ninawa's cities, in addition to other security and political factors, followed by Salah al-Din with (7.8%) of the families living in the camps.

The previous figures give the decision-maker a clear vision to arrange the priorities in dealing with displacement, especially the camps, because focusing on Ninawa and giving it the priority plays a big role in solving forced displacement. The reasons for these families to remain in displacement and endure multiple and different difficult circumstances, including those related to economic, security, political factors, and absence of shelter as a large proportion of these families' houses were completely or partially destroyed, which constitutes a major obstacle to their return to AoOs.

A MoMD survey was conducted in September 2020 to stop on the causes and barriers to return, it included a sample of displaced people in the communities representing (66.1%) of the total number of displaced families in the camps. The survey covered (36,023) families out of (54,497) families living in the camps focusing on IDPs outside Dahuk governorate, as the sample from outside Dahuk included about (86.5%) of the total number of the displaced (25,201) families, while another sample included about (48.5%) of the displaced inside Dahuk governorate, totaling 29,296 families living in 16 camps in Dahuk.

The finding of this sample can be adopted for other displaced families, whether inside or outside the camps, because the barriers to return are the same for all. Therefore, working on these factors will be in the framework of resolving and ending forced displacement file in Iraq.

Third: Classification of in-camp IDPs in light of data and statistics

As mentioned earlier in this Plan, there are numerous barriers to return. According to an MoMD survey, the barriers to return are classified to five factors (housing destruction, infrastructure, economic projects, national reconciliation and social peace, and the security and political factor) of which a number of sub-causes is based on the opinions of the sample that were included in the survey, the most important of these causes:

1. Shelter in the AoO either totally or partially destroyed
2. The lack of services and infrastructure in the AoO
3. The lack of job opportunities in the AoO .
4. AoO is a disputed area.
5. The neighborhood or the village is insecure (conflicts between residents).
6. The family or one of its members is wanted to tribes.
7. The family or one of its members is wanted to the judicial system.
8. The house in the AoO is occupied by others.
9. The house in AoO is booby-trapped.
10. The community is insecure (the presence of mines and UXO)

The aforementioned reasons are the most prominent reasons for not returning. According to the aforementioned reasons, the distribution of IDPs according to the reasons for not returning is explained in Table No. (5).

TABLE 5: REASONS OF IN-CAMP HOUSEHOLDS' NO-RETURN BY MAIN SECTORS AND REASONS

Reasons of non- return	Demolished houses rehabilitation	Infrastructures	Economic projects	National reconciliation and social peace	Security and political situation	Total

Housing in origin area is totally or partially demolished	21,976					21,976
Lack of services and infrastructure,		7,689				7,689
we have no work in area of origin			2,569			2,569
Area of origin is politically disputed over					1,229	1,229
Neighbourhood or village is insecure (struggles among the residents)				1,028		1,028
Family or one of its members is wanted to tribes				1,018		1,018
Family or one of its members is wanted to the ISF					301	301
The house in area of origin is occupied by others				235		235
The house in area of origin is laden with explosives					136	136
Neighbourhood or village is insecure (there are mines)					42	42

It is noted according to data of table No. 5 that housing destruction is the main reason for the non- returning as reported by 21.976 families out of 36.023 included in the survey and thus constitute (61%) of the reasons for non-return, followed by the infrastructure, as reported by (7.489) families (20.7%) of the reasons for non-return, in addition to the other reasons shown in the table.


It is worth noting that there are totally or partially destroyed villages. Table (6) shows the number of totally or partially destroyed villages and their geographical distribution.

TABLE 6: NUMBER OF TOTALLY OR PARTIALLY DESTROYED VILLAGES AND THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

GOVERNORATE	NUMBER OF PARTIALLY DESTROYED VILLAGES	NUMBER OF TOTALLY DESTROYED VILLAGES
Anbar	28	4
Baghdad	1	4
Diyala	14	5
Salah al-Din	25	37
Kirkuk	42	94
Ninawa	162	5
TOTAL	272	149

- Source: MoMD Data

FIGURE 6: CLASSIFICATION OF VILLAGES BY SIZE OF DESTRUCTION



According to table (6), it is noted that Ninawa and Kirkuk are the most governorates exposed to destruction partially and totally, followed by Salah al-Din and Anbar.

Referring to the main obstacle for the non-return which is presented by the fully or partially damaged of shelters, the survey findings showed that the largest percentage of families have their homes completely destroyed (17,779) out of the total sample (36,023) whose houses were completely destroyed. Table (7) classifies the IDPs houses in the AoO, by to the type of damage.

TABLE 7: SHELTER TYPE AND DAMAGE BY AOO

DAMAGE	SHELTER TYPE		TOTAL
	OWNED	RENTED	
Totally destroyed	17,779	1,794	19,573
Damaged	7,519	1,903	9,422
Looted	3,418	1,822	5,240
Undamaged	1,116	306	1,422
Booby-trapped	143	115	258
Occupied by others	68	40	108
Total	30,043	5,980	36,023

- Source: MoMD Data

Chapter three

EXECUTIVE PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES FOR THE RETURN BASED ON PRIORITIES' ANALYSIS

Executive Programs and Activities for return, based on the priorities' analysis

General principles: The outlined plans below will need to be further expanded when applied to specific areas or locations. The objective is to build on the national plan in order to develop area-level projects, e.g., at the governorate level, which provide more detailed information on specific needs, projects, persons in charge and timeframe for projects. For all projects, community engagement and participation will be the key to ensure peaceful coexistence and ownership. IDPs and host communities will be consulted to ensure that their preferences and views are reflected in project approaches. It will also be necessary to expand on the needs of priority groups, e.g., specific needs of certain age-groups, women, vulnerable groups such as those with special needs.

In the event of more immediate supported returns or departures from camps to AoO or other locations, IDPs will be provided with information about destination locations to help them make informed decisions. They will be supported before their departure in order to identify solutions and ensure their movement sustainability, such as ensuring if they have shelters when they reach their destination as well as assistance to meet basic needs as needed, e.g., food. Efforts will also be made to ensure community support networks upon arrival through coordination with local authorities, and there will be a follow-up to track whether households need additional support.

According to the survey findings related to the non-return reasons that were classified into several pillars depending on available data, classifying non-return pillars for each governorate is explained by data referred to in table (8):

TABLE (8): THE REASONS FOR THE NON-RETURN OF FAMILIES TO THEIR AOO

GOVERNORATE	SECURITY AND POLITICAL SITUATION (HHS)	PERCENTAGE TO HHS NUMBER	INFRASTRUCTURE (HHS)	PERCENTAGE TO HHS NUMBER	ECONOMIC (HHS)	PERCENTAGE TO HHS NUMBER	NATIONAL RECONCILIATION & SOCIAL PEACE (HHS)	PERCENTAGE TO HHS NUMBER	SHELTER REHABILITATION (HHS)	PERCENTAGE TO HHS NUMBER	TOTAL
Ninawa	1,394	81.6%	7,229	96.6%	2,050	79.8%	1,780	78.03%	16,649	75.76%	29,102
Anbar	187	10.94%	17	0.23%	331	12.88%	29	1.27%	1,213	5.52%	1,777
Salah al-din	53	3.10%	112	1.5%	70	2.72%	319	13.99%	2,409	10.96%	2,963
Kirkuk	29	1.7%	98	1.3%	63	2.45%	147	6.44%	739	3.36%	1,076
Diyala	3	0.17%	31	0.4%	19	0.74%	3	0.13%	813	3.7%	869
Baghdad	1	0.06%	0	0%	32	1.25%	2	0.08%	22	0.10%	57
Babylon	41	2.40%	2	0.03%	4	0.16%	1	0.04%	131	0.6%	179
Total	1,708		7,489		2,569		2,281		21,976		36,023

• Source: MoMD

Based on the data of the table 8, activities and programs for securing the return of the displaced, will be placed according to the aforesaid pillars, as well as considering obstacles and challenges for those who cannot return and/or choose to integrate or explore alternative solutions to displacement.

First: Housing destruction:

Housing is considered a main pillar within this Plan and the main element that must be focused on for the purpose of facilitating the process of voluntary return of the displaced to their areas of residence. The results of the survey showed that 60% of the reasons for non-return are due to not having shelter in the first place, or that their houses are damaged, burned, or booby-trapped. The statistics estimated about (21,976) displaced families out of a total of (36,023) families, based on a comprehensive survey form for the camp residents, whose houses are damaged.

Table (9) shows the estimates of the damage size, and that approximately (5%) of damaged houses require rehabilitation or renovation that may cost 2-5 million Iraqi dinars per house, and that the estimated cost of damage for 28% of the damaged houses is between (6-10) million dinars per house, while the estimated cost for reconstruction or renovation is (67%) of houses have been severely damaged or destroyed exceeds 10 million dinars per house.

TABLE (9): ESTIMATION OF AMOUNTS REQUIRED FOR REHABILITATING THE DAMAGED HOUSES

AMOUNT	NUMBER OF FAMILIES
2-5 million IQD	1,107
6-10 million IQD	5,650
Over 10 million IQD	15,217
Total	21,974

- Source: MoMD Data

It can be noticed from the data presented in the previous table, that houses destroyed by terrorist operations in the liberated governorates constitute a real problem to the displacement. There are other aspects that must be taken into account when reading these statistics, and in analyzing the data, provision of needs and mapping the priorities for implementation.

Realistic scientific methods depend on interrupting and interfering with the effects of more than one factor at the same time and studying the effect of the relationship among common factors. To clarify this problem, complexities, and size within the governorates in which displacement occurred, table (10) provides details of the number of families who suffer from problems of damaged houses by governorates and the estimated size of damage.

The data show that the largest percentage of housing damage is in Ninawa (76%) of the total damaged houses. While in Salah al-Din, the percentage of houses is (10%) and lower in other governorates.

Table (10) Estimates of the amounts required for rehabilitation of the damaged houses according to the governorates:

GOVERNORATE OF ORIGIN	2-5 MILLION	6-10 MILLION	OVER10 MILLION	TOTAL
Ninawa	727	4,539	11,554	16,820
Salah al-Din	202	380	1,656	2,238
Anbar	2	306	905	1,213
Diyala	136	195	483	814
Kirkuk	39	206	491	736
Babylon	1	18	112	131
Baghdad	0	6	16	22
Total	1,107	5,650	15,217	21,974

- Source: MoMD

The processing mechanism:

Given that the housing factor ranked the first place in the statistics of the causes of reluctance to return, it is necessary to look at the issue more carefully in terms of the geographical distribution of the areas of displacement, as the displaced families are originated from multiple areas within the governorates where most of them owned houses. Therefore, the processing mechanism towards the establishment of housing complexes may not suit the situation and the special nature of this IDP category and may not be a viable solution. The statistics must be detailed precisely, considering all the details that can be used for finding solutions and developing mechanisms and priorities for implementation, which helps interpret the matter into an implementation plan with an allocated financial budget.

The data contained in the previous tables can greatly help in putting real treatments in place and determining the priority of implementation. The issue should be translated into allocated funds for addressing the crisis, and it is possible to set priorities as follows:

1. Totally destroyed houses
2. Partially damaged houses
3. Booby-trapped houses
4. Looted houses
5. Illegally occupied houses

Based on the aforementioned priorities, it is possible to adopt and define various mechanisms to address the problem, including the compensation committees mechanism in the affected governorates, and increasing the financial allocations for these committees and urge them to speed up the process, which would deal with many cases in addition to the assistance of the ministries of Commerce and Industry to provide displaced families with construction materials for the long- term after obtaining the approval of the Council of Ministers and for the displaced exclusively after obtaining the necessary guarantees, depending on the MoMD database and branches in the governorates.

Booby-trapped houses and those illegally occupied by others need the intervention of competent security and judicial authorities, taking into consideration that houses falling under booby-trapped category could be listed under the category of totally or partially destroyed houses.

It is possible to coordinate with the Real Estate Bank and the Housing Fund for the purpose of housing loans to IDPs, in addition to mobilizing the international and NGOs efforts to provide contributions to the displaced families in order to rehabilitate their damaged and destroyed homes. It is also possible to include the treatment mechanisms as follows:

1. Compensating those whose houses were destroyed with up to (10) million dinars through the Central Committee for Compensating the Affected people from the terrorist and military operations.
2. Borrowing from governmental banks with the guarantee of local governments.
3. Providing displaced families with construction materials for construction purposes by the ministries of Trade and Industry.
4. Clearance of booby-trapped houses by the relevant security authorities (Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, the Directorate of Mine Action DMA)
5. Clearance of mines and UXO by the competent security authorities (Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and DMA).
6. Addressing the issue of violations and trespassing of residential houses, by the relevant authorities (Supreme Judicial Council, Ministry of Interior).
7. Establishing low-cost housing compounds in Ninawa and Salah al-Din by local governments and their allocations.

TABLE NUMBER (11) AMOUNT OF HOUSING DAMAGE AND THE TREATMENT MECHANISMS

GOVERNORATE	NINAWA	SALAH AL-DIN	ANBAR	DIYALA	KIRKUK	BABYLON	BAGHDAD	TOTAL	PROCESSING MECHANISM	ENTITY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION	ENTITY RESPONSIBLE FOR FINANCING THE IMPLEMENTATION	TIME REQUIRED FOR PROCESSING
Estimated cost of damage (2-5) Million IQD	727	202	2	136	39	1	-	1,107	Mechanism # 1&2 as mentioned previously	Central Committees for compensating people affected by the terrorist and military operations in the governorates	- National Budget - International NGOs	6 months – 1 year
Estimated cost of damage (6-10) Million IQD	4,539	380	306	195	206	18	6	5,650				
Estimated cost of damage (10<) Million IQD	11,554	1,656	905	483	491	112	16	15,217	Mechanism #2,3,4&7	- Ministry of construction, housing, municipalities, and public works - Local governments - Iraqi Housing fund, Real estate bank of Iraq - Ministry of Trade - Ministry of Industry	- National Budget - Iraqi Housing Fund and Real estate bank of Iraq - International NGOs	6 months – 1 year
Booby-trapped shelters	183	18	41	1	10	0	5	258	Mechanism #4&5	Security entities: - Ministry of interior - Ministry of Defense - Ministry of health/Directorate of Mine Action DMA	- National Budget - International NGOs	6 months – 1 year
Illegally occupied shelters	82	6	14	0	6	0	0	108	Mechanism #6	- Supreme Judicial Council - Ministry of Interior	- National Budget	6 months – 1 year

Second: Programs and activities related to infrastructure and community services

The shortage of infrastructure services is one of the most important reasons for the non-return of the displaced families to their AoO, as these services constitute an urgent necessity that cannot achieve return and stability without such services.

Based on the available data, there are (7,489) families out of (36,023) families included in the survey and attributed the main reason for their failure to return to the lack of infrastructure services in their AoO. This number of families constitutes (%20.8) of the total families included within the survey. Depending on this ratio for the totality of (54,497) families residing in the camps, there are (11,335) families, the reason for their non-return is due to the lack of infrastructure services.

According to the data of the services survey conducted by the Ministry of Migration and Displaced, there is a need for about (856) projects in various forms of infrastructure in the governorates of origin for the displaced, and that the completion of these projects will contribute to the return of a total of (144,396) displaced persons to their AoO. The executive priority must be focused on the projects, which achieve the best optimization of resources.

TABLE (12) INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY GOVERNORATES

GOVERNORATE	NUMBER OF PROJECTS	NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES
Anbar	45	53,020
Ninawa	551	28,640
Salah al-Din	100	25,316
Kirkuk	120	7,145
Diyala	27	29,502
Baghdad	13	773
Total	856	144,396

- Source: MoMD Data

To identify the type of these projects in exact way, the table number (13) gives more details per each governorate.

TABLE (13) THE GOVERNORATES' NEEDS TO INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

GOVERNORATE	HOUSING	WATER AND SANITATION	EDUCATION	HEALTH	ENERGY	TOTAL
Anbar	0	10	0	14	21	45
Ninawa	0	271	35	8	237	551
Salah al-din	0	23	50	24	3	100
Kirkuk	3	67	28	22	0	120
Diyala	0	15	6	1	5	27
Baghdad	1	10	1	0	1	13
Total	4	396	120	69	267	856

- Source: MOMD Data

The data in table (13) represents what local governments have shown in those governorates based on their available information about the situation of targeted villages and areas to secure the return of displaced individuals. Therefore, securing the requirements for return requires concerted efforts of

the central government and local governments as well as international organizations' support through the implementation of a set of projects and activities, as given below:

#	PROPOSED PROGRAMMES	ENTITY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION	ESTIMATED COST	DURATION	ENTITY RESPONSIBLE FOR FINANCING THE PROGRAMME
1	Construction and provision of 396 water, sewage system and road projects in several governorates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministry of Construction, Housing, Municipalities and public works - Mayoralty of Baghdad - Local governments 	The estimated cost will be considered later, after being studied accurately	One year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regions Development Programme - Social development Fund (WB loan) - Poverty Reduction strategy Programme - International organizations
2	Construction of 120 schools in several governorates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministry of education - Local governments 		1 – 2 yrs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investment Programme of the ministries - Regions Development Programme - International NGOs
3	Construction of 69 PHC centers (providing them with equipment) in several governorates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministry of health - Local governments 		1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investment Programme of the ministries - Regions Development Programme - International NGOs
4	Establishing and supplying 267 power projects in several governorates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministry of electricity - Ministry of oil - Local governments 		1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investment Programme of the ministries - Regions Development Programme - International NGOs

The projects mentioned in table 13 represent the maximum number of infrastructure projects to be completed in governorates, which will be identified accurately after being examined and compared with the implemented and continuing projects within the governmental investment programs.

Third: Programs and activities related to the security and political aspects and national reconciliation:

The security and political factors, tribal and ethno-religious and sectarian tensions represent an obstacle to the return of a considerable number of families and to ensure the infrastructure's ability for service provision, such as schools and health centers. More support will be required to facilitate training and recruitment of government employees to maintain the infrastructure and services provision.

With regards to educational activities, specific activities will need to be supported for children who have been out of school for many years due to the occupation. This includes providing psychosocial support for children, training for teachers, remedial education, supporting informal education, and school material and supplies.

Medical facilities and hospitals require on-going management, supplies, training of medical professionals.

The number of families according to statistics is approximately (3,989) families that constitute about (11%) of the total sample surveyed, totaling (36,023) families. If the results of this survey are circulated

to the rest of the displaced community in the camps, (54,497) there will be about (5,994) families that cannot return to their AoO for the aforementioned reasons.

These reasons vary and differ based on differences of governorates and areas. The most important reasons are:

1. AoO is a disputed area.
2. The family or one of its members is wanted by the security forces.
3. The shelter in AoO is booby-trapped.
4. The neighborhood or village is not safe (presence of mines and UXO).
5. Unsafe neighborhood or village (conflicts between residents).
6. The family or one of its members is tribally wanted.
7. The shelter in the AoO is occupied by others.

Table (14) shows the distribution of families according to the mentioned reasons.

TABLE 14: SECURITY AND POLITICAL REASONS PREVENTING THE RETURN OF FAMILIES

#	CAUSES	NUMBER OF FAMILIES	PERCENTAGE TO TOTAL FAMILIES
1	AoO is a disputed area	1,229	30.81%
2	The family or one of its members is wanted by the security forces	301	7.55%
3	The shelter in AoO is booby-trapped	136	3.41%
4	The neighborhood or village is not safe (Presence of mines and UXO)	42	1.05%
5	Unsafe neighborhood or village (conflicts between residents).	1,028	25.77%
6	Family or one of its members is tribally wanted	1,018	25.52%
7	The shelter in AoO is occupied by others	235	5.895
Total		3,989	100%

- Source: MoMD Data

Regarding to the geographical distribution of those families by governorates is explained in table no (15).

GOVERNORATE	SECURITY AND POLITICAL REASONS	PERCENTAGE TO TOTAL FAMILIES	TRIBAL AND SECTARIAN TENSIONS	PERCENTAGE TO THE TOTAL FAMILIES	TOTAL
Anbar	187	10.94%	29	10.27%	215
Ninawa	1,394	81.62%	1,780	78.04%	3,174
Salah al-Din	53	3.10%	319	13.99%	373
Kirkuk	29	1.7%	147	6.44%	176
Diyala	3	0.17%	3	0.13%	6
Baghdad	1	0.06%	2	0.08%	3
Babylon	41	2.40%	1	0.04%	3
Total	1,708	99,099%	2,281	99.99%	3,989

- Source: MoMD Data

Geographical targeted data in conflict-affected areas indicate that IDPs and returnees have concerns related to discrimination, marginalization, demographic change, and retaliation in their AoO. Some MoMD data indicate that about (4%) of the IDPs in camps are unlikely to return, due to political and security reasons.

In general, the tensions related to the non-return of the displaced in Iraq are divided into sectarian and political tensions, as in the case of Babylon, Diyala and parts of Salah al-Din, and tribal tensions, as in the case of Salah al-Din and Anbar, and ethnic and political tensions, as in the case of Ninawa and parts of Diyala and Kirkuk.

The tribal and social disputes were born during ISIS control of some areas and the need for recruitment. Despite the end of sectarian fighting and the relative return of peace and security, ISIS control over large areas in the western and northern areas of the country in June 2014 once again exposed coexistence and civil peace to danger, in order to destroy Iraqi society and feed violence and extremism via all material and media means, and the result was the collapse of the political process and handing the power over to a group of extremists who do not care about dialogue communication, and acceptance of the other but reasoned to kill, terrorize and destroy. That led different communities to reject them and try to get rid of them for restoring peace and stability to the society that faced difficult challenges to undermine its coexistence and civil peace during the past years. Thus, voluntary, and safe return of all displaced Iraqis cannot be guaranteed, partially because lack of acceptance by Iraqi communities to move towards reconciliation. The reason may be their fear of following judicial procedures against them and the provision of improper detention conditions for those accused of accusations.

Since the procedure for reconciliation between the conflicting groups is a long and difficult work, especially in tribal communities where disputes cannot be resolved through geographical separation, so it requires a degree of political interaction and spreading the culture of partnership in shaping the future.

The pursuit to achieve true peaceful coexistence and spread it among the disputed groups within the same IDP community after returning to their AoO is a hard work that requires great and serious efforts. Therefore, the programs of national reconciliation must include the most important policies of peaceful coexistence:

1. Resolving and strengthening the issue of Iraqi national identity if stability and coexistence are to be established and rooted.
2. Abolishing the sectarian quota system that trigger conflicts.
3. Engaging religious institutions in disseminating the spirit of tolerance, rejecting violence and sectarianism, and correct religious concepts among members of society.
4. Give the tribal leaders and Sheikhs a real role in the process of bridging the gap in Iraqi society and removing the civil fights and sectarianism from it.
5. Promoting the principle of citizenship and restoring the citizen's confidence that the citizen is an active part within the general movement of society.
6. Strengthening the role and effectiveness of civil society institutions that play the role of mediator between the authority and society.
7. Engaging women in the peacemaking process and giving them an active role in their society after the return.
8. Establishing political institutions that are limited to disseminating a culture of peaceful coexistence in areas where the IDPs returns to or support their integration in alternative areas.

There is a need for social reconciliation in more than one governorate that has witnessed displacement, such as Diyala, Salah al-Din, Ninawa and Babylon. The availability of a rich environment for reconciliation between the disputed tribes may lead to the return of approximately 9,000 families, as a large part of these families still reside in camps.

The issues referred to in this pillar are sensitive and require special handling to mobilize all efforts of central government, local governments, civil society organizations, tribal leaders, clerics to end the

suffering of these families, through a series of activities, enhanced by national reconciliation and social peace. The treatment procedures can be summarized within this framework, through the following matrix:

#	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTING PARTY	ESTIMATED COST	DURATION	SUPPORTING PARTY
1	Formation of Joint committee in local governments to Activate reconciliation and achieve the social peace	- Local governments - National security Service - Ministry of interior - Ministry of defense - CSOs - Tribal and community leaders		1 year	- COMSEC
2	Making political decisions that aim to return of IDP families to their areas or support alternative efforts, such as integration	- Council of ministers		6 months – 1 year	- Ministry of defense - Ministry of interior - National Security Advisory - PMF Commission
3	Mobilization of the engineering effort of MOD to remove the mines from AoO	- Ministry of defense		6 months – 1 year	- Ministry of interior - International NGOs
4	Carrying out media campaign aiming encouraging the civil coexistence and national reconciliation	- Iraqi Media Network	-	6 months	- COMSEC

Fourth: The programs and activities for the sustainable stability, rehabilitation, and community development after the return

The response plans for the displaced upon their return must include providing them with sustainable stability, as it is the best solution to displacement in Iraq. Therefore, the Iraqi government, in coordination and cooperation with its local and international partners, must adopt number of developments, rehabilitation and sustainability programs following the voluntary return in addition to other solutions, including integration. The concept of IDPs’ post return sustainable stability revolves around two main pillars: the economic pillar and the social development pillar, which are based on number of priorities that can be adopted as indicators of post return sustainable stability, as follows:

- Long term safety and security and freedom of movement
- Decent living conditions including the minimum level of enough water and shelter, health care and basic education.
- Job opportunities and livelihoods
- Access to mechanisms for housing, land and property restoration or providing compensation.
- Access to personal documentation, HLP and compensation
- Voluntary family reunion
- Establishing sustainable projects from a technical, economic, financial, environmental, and social perspective that continue to provide mid- long-term benefits.

These criteria are aligned with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) for Durable Solutions, Returns Working Group (RWG) in Iraq, jointly with other UN agencies. International entities have classified the remaining IDPs caseload of protracted displacement into three categories, depending on the criteria that were used in analyzing the situation of the in the camp and out-of-camp IDPs, and

thus understanding the obstacles that prevent them from returning to their AoO. The classification included several factors, some of them are related to IDPs themselves and others include access to government facilities and services provided by various ministries, in addition to some factors and concerns based on tribal disputes that accompanied the displacement of these families and thus need exceptional efforts from the relevant government agencies in addition to flexibility and acceptance by the host communities. The classification concluded that closing some areas and preventing the displaced from return is considered the biggest challenge in mapping sustainable solutions for the displaced. The table below shows the classification and obstacles for each category. It is worth noting that IDPs may fall into multiple categories:

TABLE 16: PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS ACCORDING TO RWG

CATEGORY 1: SERVICE OR MATERIAL INTERVENTIONS	CATEGORY 2: COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION, DIALOGUE AND SOCIAL INTERVENTIONS	CATEGORY 3: ADVOCACY AND NEGOTIATIONS
Needs for resources, materials, and services, in areas of origin and displacement.	Social cohesion issues	Access and Security challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Damaged / destroyed housing. • HLP issues • Lack of economic opportunity / jobs • Mental health issues • Lack of basic services (water, electricity, education, health, etc.) • ERW / UXO / IED contamination • Debris prevents reconstruction. • Lost, damaged, or invalid civil documentation /Protection services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ethno-religious tension, and protection • Perceived affiliation to extremists (allowed to return by authorities but fearful of revenge, reprisal, lack of community acceptance) • Other issues preventing acceptance of returnees by communities such as mental health) <p><i>Societies facing these challenges may also face Category 1 challenges.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Areas blocked. • Perceived affiliation to extremists (blocked from return by authorities) • Lack of security clearance • House occupation (by armed groups)

A. THE ECONOMIC PILLAR:

The role of governments rises in finding durable solutions for the displaced, and these solutions are often supported through legislation, policies, and plans. The establishment of sustainable SMEs in the affected areas creates job opportunities for the voluntary returnees and ensures their stability.

The MoMD has sought to provide internal support or in partnership with governmental and humanitarian institutions to enable the in- camp and out-of-camp IDPs to access durable solutions. UN projects, including the UNDP, the UN-Habitat and the IOM have a great impact and effective role in enabling hundreds of displaced families to return to their AoO in a safe, and dignified manner.

MoMD's efforts went beyond the communication link with humanitarian partners, looking for a more effective role for the government entities, such as the Supreme Committee for Relief and Shelter Displaced, MoP, the Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights, the National Security Advisory and others that are likely to have an exceptional role in the return of the remaining in-camp IDP families. Closing the displacement file requires fulfilling all its requirements, including post return sustainable stability. At the top of those requirements is the provision of income generation/job opportunities for families to enable them to secure their daily living necessities. It is well known that IDPs have suffered from difficult economic conditions during years of displacement, including losing their jobs and interests and depleting their savings, and thus providing means of living for this group is yet one of the most important conditions for stability after the return. A survey of the reasons for non-return,

indicated that (2,569) families need economic projects in their areas to provide job opportunities, and these families constitute a percentage (7%) of the total families included in the survey. If the results of the survey are generalized to the rest of the community, it is expected that approximately (3,814) families will face barriers of economic factors and lack of basic job opportunities.

Given the exceptional circumstances that faced the liberated governorates, especially in rural communities, it was necessary to find mechanisms to eliminate unemployment and empower the poor in rural communities, particularly to achieve security and stability for these communities in addition to the optimal investment of human resources in the development process. These mechanisms are:

- Resuming the local economy and empowering the displaced population in rural areas.
- Creating local economic activities that ensure the provision of decent work opportunities and help in promoting sustainable growth and improving the quality of life.
- Enhance the opportunities for peace and stability in the rural community.

The process of empowering youth requires fundamental changes in the economic environment that should expand their opportunities for participation and involvement in the decent work market and to enhance their capabilities for entrepreneurship within the framework of the principles of justice, equality, and equal opportunities. Economic empowerment of the youth group can be achieved through:

- Expanding the database of liberated areas related to the unemployed, and improving the mechanisms of inclusion, far from discrimination based on identity or gender in order to overcome the problem of unemployment.
- Reducing unemployment rates among young people who have certificates of graduation, in addition to young people who do not have any educational level, by rehabilitating them through opening vocational training centers in the liberated governorates, as well as giving them incentives with the international community's support and building vocational training and rehabilitation centers aiming to build the capacity with the local CSO's support.
- Entrepreneurship in providing job opportunities through loans provided by the MoLSA's loans department or through loans from private banks / Youth Employment Project. This requires raising the level of funding, technical support, and implementation by MoLSA/ Ministry of Youth / NGOs and with the support of international agencies.

Regarding women and women empowerment, this requires:

- Support opportunities to fulfil social and economic independence and focus on women, girls, widows, unemployed divorced and provide them with loans for establishing small projects within their communities.
- Expanding the database of liberated areas related to the unemployed and improving means of inclusion away from discrimination on the basis of identity or gender type in order to overcome the problem of unemployment among women.
- Entrepreneurship to provide job opportunities through loans provided by the MoLSA's loans department.
- Provide financial support for funding by international organizations and partnership by NGOs to coordinate and implement mechanism for inclusion through the database and providing job opportunities.

B. THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PILLAR:

In the camps IDPs were exposed to difficult conditions during the displacement or before in the areas under ISIS rule, which affected their psychological conditions. Also, some displaced were exposed to shocks that generated negative reactions within themselves against the government and security forces and the rest of the people, which require to rehabilitate these families psychologically to be good citizens in the community along with the treatment of their legal status that resulted from those circumstances in relation to registering assets, new births and issuing identity documents. This calls for strengthening the role of the social workers in integrating returnees into their communities and providing psychological and social support programs in addition to legal support.

The social rehabilitation in the liberated areas requires attention to the following impacts:

- The IDPs' psychological, economic and security impacts are serious, and the social effects are sensitive and more serious. What happened in Iraq has significantly affected the Iraqi social fabric, which requires building bridges of trust between the people of the liberated areas and other minorities and promote trust in the federal government's desire to expedite the treatment of their immediate conditions.
- Achieving community integration by benefiting from the South African experience in implementing national reconciliation and community integration for the process of building the state by issuing a general amnesty for the perpetrators of some crimes in accordance with regulations in order to achieve civil peace and community reconciliation. Therefore, mechanisms and approaches must be put in place that cope with the challenges of tribal, ethnic and sectarian entrenchment that constitute challenges to reconciliation, and accordingly, local actors who adopt the national project to achieve peace must be encouraged to lead reconciliation initiatives by expanding their political and social presence in the government.
- A systematic mechanism is being put in place to confront the interacting and accumulating problems. Facing the dividing projects is one of the big issues in Iraq that is not related to the political side only but to the social, cultural, and psychological aspect, and this requires activating the role of civil society organizations in forming volunteer teams to participate in re-disseminating the spirit of citizenship and dealing with all Iraqis equally before the law, through activating dialogue between parties at the social level, to reach unified bearings. This requires addressing the fears and feelings of injustice and marginalization of the various national, religious, and sectarian components, and achieving the social justice for the liberated areas as well as addressing ISIS brainwashing ideologies. Thus, it is important to open centers for psychological rehabilitation of women, young and adults.
- Families living in critical shelters such abandoned buildings will necessarily lead to the spread of some negative consequences, especially among young age groups and adolescents, in addition to the emergence of problems and differences between the displaced families due to the different temperaments, customs, behaviors and cultural perspectives. Thus, intensive programs must be established to protect these groups from acquiring these damaging customs and instilling a culture of respect, cooperation, love and coexistence.
- Inculcating peaceful culture in the hearts of children by establishing cultural and dialogue centers in which families participate and cooperate with each other. The government officials have a great task, especially in the Ministry of Youth and the Ministry of Education to provide the necessary atmosphere for the success of education, and rehabilitation during the period of displacement, and the role of civil society should not be absent in youth, childhood and women's affairs.
- There are major psychological and social problems resulting from scenes of death, destruction, displacement, loss of parents and exposure to violence that had its effects upon them, which requires establishing psychotherapy units and the activation of the role of social researchers to follow these cases before they aggravate.

- Establishing a specific timeframe for the affected areas to remove the remnants of ISIS psychologically and culturally, with redoubled efforts to improve social conditions, with the support of regional and international donor states for the purposes of rehabilitation and construction.

Regarding the issue of social empowerment of youth, this requires:

- The integration of youth into society through the launch of public awareness campaigns, as well as to encourage youth empowerment and take advantage of traditional media and the social media in order to promote the campaign messages, enhance youth interaction with decision-makers and ensure that the government reflects their concerns and needs.
- Raising awareness about the dangers facing the youth and ending their vulnerability to extremist ideologies, by strengthening the work of civil society organizations and research centers in universities and international organizations and respecting all identities, regardless of their intellectual, ethnic, or political domains. Young people bear the greatest responsibility for preserving the national identity because of their material and moral potentials and capabilities that can contribute to building the national identity. The state with its competent departments is supposed to pay attention to these energies and direct them to provide the best possible achievements for the country.
- Activating the role of the media through various intellectual, cultural, and social awareness programs directed towards the youth.
- Setting a modern educational curriculum that is inclusive of the gender perspective and improving the infrastructure and facilities for schools.

Aligning education strategies and policies adapted to the education and teaching in the liberated governorates to reduce school dropout rates and increase school enrolment rates by reviewing and improving educational curricula and improving the infrastructure of schools and universities with the support of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, the Ministry of Education, international organizations, and NGOs.

The addressing procedures can be summarized within this framework in table (17).

TABLE 17: THE PROPOSED PLAN FOR POST- RETURN SUSTAINABLE STABILITY, REHABILITATION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

#	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTING PARTNER	ESTIMATED COST	DURATION	SUPPORTING PARTNERS
1	Intensive employment programmes to provide job opportunities to the returnees	- MoLSA - Ministry of Youth and Sport - Local governments		1 year	- MoP - International NGOs - Federal Service Council
2	Facilitated loan programmes for SMEs	- MoLSA - Governmental banks		6 months – 1 year	- MoP - Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) - Civil Banks Association
3	Agricultural loans to sustain the stability of families	- MoA - Governmental Banks		6 months – 1 year	- CBI - Civil Banks Association
4	Psychological support programs and social support to the returnees	- MoLSA - Ministry of Justice - Supreme Judicial Council		6 months – 1 year	- International NGOs
5	Addressing the legal status of the displaced	- Ministry of Interior - Ministry of Justice - Supreme Judicial Council		6 months – 1 year	- International NGOs

It could summarize of what was mentioned in axes the bodies responsible for carrying out the proposed programs as that indicated in table (18).

TABLE 18
RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN

#	IMPLEMENTING PARTY	ACTIVITY
1	- COMSEC - Compensation committees in the governorates	- Reconstructing the destroyed houses - Taking political decisions to decisively end the file of returnees to their areas
2	- Ministry of Reconstruction, Housing, municipalities, and public works - Housing fund	- Reconstructing the destroyed houses - Construction and equipping 396 water and sanitation and roads projects in several governorates
3	- MoF - Real estate Bank of Iraq - Other governmental banks	- Reconstructing the damaged houses - Granting agricultural loans for sustaining the families' stability
4	- Local governments	- Reconstructing the damaged houses - Building and supplying 396 sanitation and water and roads projects in several governorates - Establishing 120 schools in various governorates - A project of establishing 69 health centers. - Establishing energy 267 projects in various governorates - Forming joint committees in the local governments for each governorate to undertake the mission of the national reconciliation activation and social coexistence fulfilment. - Intensive operations programs to provide job opportunities for the returnees
5	- MoI	- Addressing the explosive- booby-trapped houses. - Addressing the illegally occupied properties - Forming joint committees in the local governments for each governorate to undertake the mission of the national reconciliation activation and social coexistence fulfilment. - Addressing the legal issues of the displaced
6	- MoD	- Addressing the explosive- booby-trapped houses - Mobilizing the engineering effort to remove mines from AoO. - Composing joint committee in the local governments for each governorate to undertake the mission of the national reconciliation activation and social peace.
7	- MoLSA	- Intensive operations programs to provide job opportunities for the returnees. - Granting agricultural loans for carrying out small projects and medium projects. - Provide social and psychological support
8	- MoT	- Reconstructing the damaged and destroyed houses
9	- Ministry of industry and minerals	- Reconstructing the damaged and destroyed houses
10	- Ministry of health and environment/ Directorate of Mine Action DMA	- Reconstructing the damaged and destroyed houses. - A project of establishing 69 health centers
11	- Supreme Judicial Council	- Illegally Occupied Houses - Addressing the IDPs' legal status
12	- Mayoralty of Baghdad	- Building and supplying 396 projects sanitation and water and roads projects in a number of governorates
13	- Ministry of Education (MoE)	- Construction of 120 schools in several governorates
14	- Ministry of Electricity (MoE)	- Establishing 267 energy projects in various governorates
15	- Ministry of Oil (MoO)	- Establishing 267 energy projects in various governorates
16	- National Security Service (NSS)	- Forming joint committees in the local governments for each governorate to undertake the mission of the national reconciliation and achieving social peace
17	- Iraqi Media Network	- Carrying out a media campaign to encourage the civil peace and national reconciliation

18	- Ministry of Justice (MoJ)	- Carrying out social and psychological support for the returnees - Addressing the IDPs' legal status
19	- Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)	- Granting loans for sustaining the families' stability
20	- Directorate of NGOs	- Forming joint committees in the local governments for each governorate to undertake the mission of the national reconciliation activation and social peace. - Carrying out social and psychological support for the returnees
21	- Religious endowments	- Forming joint committees in the local governments for each governorate to undertake the mission of the national reconciliation activation and social peace
22	- MoJ/ Directorate of Tribal Affairs	- Forming joint committees in local governments for each governorate to undertake the task of activating national reconciliation and achieving social peace